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Graves: Breaking the Binary: Desegregation of Bathrooms

BREAKING THE BINARY: DESEGREGATION OF
BATHROOMS
Timothy J. Graves

INTRODUCTION
Sex discrimination is prohibited in the United States by several
laws and constitutional guarantees.1 In recent years, the public
bathroom has become a battleground for equal rights under these
laws, both in the courts and the local legislature.2 Some states have
attempted to legislate access to sex-segregated bathrooms
purportedly based on biology, defining sex in a myriad of ways,
which exclude gender-diverse individuals.3 Meanwhile, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has held that denying
access to a bathroom corresponding with gender identity constitutes
sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.4 While the EEOC’s approach to bathroom access is a
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. First and foremost, I’d like to thank
my incredible significant other, Jessica, and my amazing friends and roommates, Amber and Claire,
whose support through the months of writing and re-writing I could not have done without. To my
faculty advisor, Meg Butler, I could not have asked for a better mentor and source of inspiration. Thanks
to my tireless editors, Caitlin Correa and Richard Uberto, whose much-needed feedback led me through
drafts. A special thank you to all the attorneys who reviewed my drafts and offered thoughtful clarity
and perspective. I could not have done this without your invaluable commentary. You pushed me to
improve and my work is all the better for it. Thank you.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(d) (2018); Educational Amendments Act of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Marka B. Fleming & Gwendolyn McFadden-Wade, The Legal Implications Under Federal
Law when States Enact Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom Laws for Students and Employees, 29
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 163–70 (2018). The fight for bathroom access particularly affects
transgender individuals. Id.
3. Id. at 163 (“[B]etween 2013 and 2017, approximately twenty-four states considered enacting
transgender bathroom laws to restrict the use of public bathrooms to the individual’s biological sex.”).
North Carolina is one of the most notable of those states. Id. In contrast, in 2018, only eight states and
the District of Columbia had enacted gender identity-based laws governing public restrooms, all of
which were narrowly written to cover education, employment, or a limited combination of the two, as
opposed to providing broad discrimination protection. Id. at 160–61.
4. Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756, at *7–8 (Apr. 1, 2015)
(holding that requiring proof of medical procedures for permission to access sex-segregated restrooms
or requiring the use of a single-user unisex restroom constitutes sex discrimination because it “isolate[s]
and segregate[s] [one] from other persons of [their] gender” and “perpetuate[s] the sense that [one is]
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step towards equal treatment, it fails to adequately acknowledge that
the very segregation of bathrooms by sex is problematic—everyone
is a mixture of multiple sex characteristics and, while anatomy may
be an accurate proxy for non-intersex people who identify with the
gender they were assigned at birth, there are many for whom sexsegregated bathrooms will never match their gender identity.5 For
many, “male” and “female” do not accurately describe their gender
identity.6 Gender identity is a person’s internal sense of their own
gender of being male, female, another gender, or no gender.7 Among
others, non-binary, intersex, and transgender individuals may fall
somewhere between the binary options, or even outside of the
limitations of the spectrum altogether.8 Despite the recent progressive
movement in expanding gender markers on identity documents,9 the
law continues to resist acknowledging an expansive perception of
gender beyond the rigid, binary system, especially when it comes to
bathroom access.10
not worthy of equal treatment and respect”).
5. See Shelby Hanssen, Beyond Male or Female: Using Nonbinary Gender Identity to Confront
Outdated Notions of Sex and Gender in the Law, 96 OR. L. REV. 283, 284–88 (2017) (detailing the
relationship between “sex” and “gender” identity and describing the complexities of categorization by
chromosomes, genitalia, or gender identity as it pertains to the non-binary, genderqueer, transgender,
and intersex communities).
6. Id. at 286-87. “[S]ex is a ‘vast’ continuum that defies the constraints of the traditional
male/female binary [T]he existence of such a varied spectrum of sex designations challenges the
assumptions underlying gender binarism. In this light, limiting people to the categories of male or
female is overly reductive.” Id.
7. Adams v. Sch. Bd., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1298–99 (M.D. Fla. 2018).
8. Angie Martell, Legal Issues Facing Transgender and Gender-Expansive Youth, 96 MICH. B.J.
30, 30 (2017) (explaining “gender expansive” is a more positive term than “gender nonconforming” and
that “a whole spectrum of gender identification” exists “between the binary biological sex categories of
male and
female.”);
see,
e.g.,
Definition
of
Terms,
UC
BERKELEY,
https://campusclimate.berkeley.edu/students/ejce/geneq/resources/lgbtq-resources/definition-terms
[https://perma.cc/K5HN-RMBG] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). Agender, bigender, gender fluid, gender
non-conforming, genderqueer, gender variant, intersex, pangender, transgender, and two-spirit
individuals may identify outside the binary male and female options. Id. Gender identity is so wideranging that since 2014, social media giant Facebook has expanded the available gender options users
can select from two to fifty-nine, including the opportunity to “fill in the blank.” Facebook Users Now
Have New Gender Option: Fill in the Blank, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015, 6:08 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/facebook-users-now-have-new-gender-option-fill-blankn313716 [https://perma.cc/N2GW-5S9C].
9. Rachel Savage, Nonbinary? Intersex? 11 U.S. States Issuing Third Gender IDs, REUTERS (Jan.
31, 2019, 1:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-us-lgbt-lawmaking/nonbinary-intersex-11-usstates-issuing-third-gender-ids-idUSKCN1PP2N7 [https://perma.cc/QM98-YU7J].
10. Hanssen, supra note 5, at 289 (“Few courts have adopted an analytical approach reflecting the
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This note discusses how the binary view of gender in relation to
public bathroom segregation is insufficient to meet the diverse needs
of the public and proposes the desegregation of bathrooms as the
solution to promote gender equality and reduce gender-based social
imbalances. This note will focus on the bathroom rights of
individuals who identify outside of the binary options of male and
female, viewed through the lens of how transgender people
identifying within the binary have been treated by the courts. For the
purposes of this note, the term non-binary will be used to refer to
these individuals.11 Part I provides a brief overview of recent
bathroom legislation in the United States, the statutory and
constitutional framework that has been applied to sex discrimination
claims, and the courts’ treatment of gender-based discrimination
claims under each law. Part II analyzes gender-based discrimination
claims in relation to public bathroom access under this framework in
light of how courts have treated gender litigation and addresses
widespread myths about privacy and safety concerns. Part III
proposes the complete desegregation of bathrooms based on gender,
considers which legal claim is the best avenue of implementing
desegregation, delineates the benefits of such implementation, and
addresses potential concerns raised by this proposal.

variety of sex designations consistent with contemporary gender theory or statistical realities.”); Martell,
supra note 8, at 31 (“Historically, non-binary transgender people have largely been excluded from the
discussion of transgender people, which has caused them to be further marginalized in legal circles.”);
see also Patrick C. Brayer, Gender Nonconforming Expression and Binary Thinking: Understanding
How Implicit Bias Becomes Explicit in the Legal System, Considering the Shooting Death of Philando
Castile, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 44, 46–48 (2018) (describing “a number of setbacks in
eliminating laws, policies, and regulations negatively impacting people who are transgender, gender
fluid, and non-binary”).
Nonbinary gender identity is a novel legal concept. Gender binarism and resulting
“dichotomous sexual tradition” dominate the current legal landscape. Scholars such
as Saru Matambanadzo and Alice Domurat Dreger have commented on the evolution
of legal and medical understandings of sex, as well as the interplay between the two.
For much of history, one’s “medical” sex determined property and voting rights.
Until recently, one’s sex determined whom one could marry. Currently, legal
determinations of sex can still affect one’s life. The current legal landscape, by and
large, does not provide identity options for non-normative gender identities.
Hanssen, supra note 5, at 288.
11. Definition of Terms, supra note 8.
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I. Background
Bathrooms were not always envisioned as particular to sex,12 but
today the sex-segregated public restroom is so prevalent that Judge
Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit improperly characterized it as
“commonplace and universally accepted” that public facilities be
segregated by sex “[a]cross societies and throughout history.”13 This
perception has contributed to the emergence of the “bathroom
narrative,” which typecasts any proposed LGBTQIA+14
nondiscrimination bill as opening the bathroom door for sexual
predators to victimize young girls and women under the guise of
claiming to be transgender.15 Many states have reacted by
considering “biology-based” bathroom legislation, closing the door to
many whose gender identities do not align with how they are
perceived by others.16 Such proposed statutes have been struck
12. Laura Portuondo, The Overdue Case Against Sex-Segregated Bathrooms, 29 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 465, 471–74 (2018). Public restrooms were not a common feature until after the 1870s and
were for male use under the theory that men and women inhabited “separate spheres,” wherein women
did not need access to public lavatories because they were meant to remain in the home. Id. The advent
of sex-segregated public restrooms began as women entered the workforce in factories and had its roots
in the perception of women as weak and vulnerable, requiring special protection in line with Victorian
ideals of modesty and social morality. Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law,
Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 54 (2007).
13. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Michael Gold, The ABCs of L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html
[https://perma.cc/NUS3TYK3]. LGBTQIA+ stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer or questioning, intersex, and asexual.
Id. “The ‘+’ symbol simply stands for all of the other sexualities, sexes, and genders that aren’t included
in these few letters.” Id.
15. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How Purported Concerns Over Safety
Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real Religious Liberty Concerns, 20 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1373, 1383–87 (2017). The “bathroom narrative” has “hobbled” efforts to enact
nondiscrimination bills at state and municipal levels throughout the United States. Id. at 1387. Despite
the use of the “bathroom narrative” to prevent the passing of nondiscrimination bills, supporters
maintain that including gender identity protection with sexuality protections in public accommodations
is non-negotiable, and Americans overwhelmingly agree that LGBTQIA+ protections are needed and
favorable. Id. at 1383, 1389.
16. Fleming & McFadden-Wade, supra note 2, at 163. For example, Kansas House Bill 2737 and
Senate Bill 513 proposed a school-centered restriction on public restrooms, which defined sex as “being
male or female . . . determined by a person’s chromosomes, and . . . identified at birth by a person’s
anatomy.” Id. at 166. Some states, such as Indiana, have proposed criminalizing bathroom use
inconsistent with these biological proscriptions. Id. at 167. However, this sort of definition of sex fails to
account for individuals whose chromosomes or anatomy do not comport to a strictly binary system. See
Hanssen, supra note 5, at 286–87 (“[O]ne in every one hundred people has atypical sex anatomy that
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down—often in committee—before becoming law, with the
exception of North Carolina’s House Bill 2 (HB2).17 HB2 required
that government agencies within the state segregate all multipleoccupancy public restrooms by “biological sex,” which the statute
defined as male or female as listed on a person’s birth certificate.18 In
response to overwhelming negative backlash from the federal
government and private companies, newly-elected Governor Roy
Cooper, signed a bill that partially repealed HB2 in March 2017.19
The net result is that bathroom usage in the United States lies largely
in the hands of the courts, which considers the rights of individuals
related to federal sex discrimination claims on the basis of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Educational
Amendments Act of 1972, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.20
differs from the ‘standard’ male or female. . . . There are at least eighteen documented sex
designations [L]imiting people to the categories of male or female is overly reductive.”); Intersex,
MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001669.htm [https://perma.cc/4Y4X-8JRU] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2018). Intersex anatomy may combine traditionally male and female anatomical
characteristics in a variety of combinations irrespective of XX or XY chromosomal makeup and may
even have differing chromosome patterns such as XO, XXY, and XXX. Id.
17. Fleming & McFadden-Wade, supra note 2, at 163–68. HB2 passed in March 2016 in reaction to
an ordinance the city of Charlotte enacted the month before, which prevented discrimination against
LGBT people on the municipal level. Riley Leonard, Thailand’s Gender Equality Act: A Solution for the
United States’ Transgender Bathroom Debate, 35 WIS. INT’L L.J. 670, 677–78 (2018).
18. Fleming & McFadden-Wade, supra note 2, at 169. Government agencies included those under
the control of the state council, local boards of education, the judicial and legislative branches of
government, and other political subdivisions. Id.
19. Id. at 172. The Department of Justice under the Obama Administration filed suit against the state
on the grounds that HB2 constituted a violation of Title IX and Title VII, prompting North Carolina to
file suit against the federal government in return. Id. at 170–72. The state was ultimately boycotted by
many companies and celebrities, including PayPal, Deutsche Bank, the National Basketball Association,
and the National College Athletic Association; both lawsuits were eventually dropped. Mark Berman,
Justice Dept. Drops Federal Lawsuit over North Carolina’s ‘Bathroom Bill,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 14,
2017, 11:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/14/justice-deptdrops-federal-lawsuit-over-north-carolinas-bathroom-bill/ [https://perma.cc/S76V-HZUY]. Despite the
repeal of the bathroom provisions, HB2 continues to prevent local governments—like Charlotte—from
passing public accommodation nondiscrimination laws until December 2020 by providing that state
legislature has sole control over such regulations. Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott C. McLaughlin,
North Carolina
Repeals ‘Bathroom Bill,’ CNN (Mar.
30, 2017, 9:36 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VQV6-8FJP].
20. See Fleming & McFadden-Wade, supra note 2, at 172–73 (“Plaintiffs commonly assert that the
law violates either Title IX and/or Title VII.”); Nathan Heffernan, Potty Politics: G.G. ex rel. Grimm v.
Gloucester County School Board, Title IX, and the Challenges Faced by Transgender Students Under
the Trump Administration and Beyond, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 215, 221 (2017) (“The Equal
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A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from
workplace discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.21 The EEOC is the government agency responsible
for interpreting and enforcing Title VII.22 Plaintiffs must establish
that they (1) are a member of a protected class, (2) suffered adverse
employment action, (3) were qualified for the position, and (4) were
treated differently from those outside of the protected class to
maintain a claim under Title VII.23 In a landmark case for Title VII,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court ruled that
discrimination based on nonconformity to gender stereotypes
constitutes sex discrimination.24 The Supreme Court has never
considered the question of what constitutes sex, a factor that has
contributed to differing opinions from the lower courts as to whether
transgender individuals constitute a protected class per se.25 Price
Waterhouse opened up a new window for protection of transgender
people under Title VII by recognizing that treating people differently
because of sex stereotypes violates the statute, and courts have
Protection Clause . . . has been repeatedly used to contest gender-based government action.”).
21. Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm [https://perma.cc/9MSH-GMUQ] (last visited Sept. 15,
2018).
22. Id.
23. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004).
24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251–52 (1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group.”).
25. See e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Schroer v. Billington, 577
F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). Following precedent in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, the Tenth Circuit
denied Title VII protection to transgender individuals as a separate class per se, stating that “[i]n light of
the traditional binary conception of sex,” transgender status alone was not sufficient to state a claim, but
a claim may still be brought if the discrimination is based on binary sex stereotypes. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at
1221–22. In contrast, the D.C. District Court ruled that discrimination because of transgender status was
per se sex discrimination since it was “because of . . . sex.” Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306. The
Schroer court analogized exclusion of “transgender” from gender protections under Title VII to
exclusion of “converts” from religious protections. Id.
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from Christianity to Judaism.
Imagine too that her employer testifies that he harbors no bias toward either
Christians or Jews but only “converts.” That would be a clear case of discrimination
“because of religion.” No court would take seriously the notion that “converts” are
not covered by the statute. Discrimination “because of religion” easily encompasses
discrimination because of a change of religion.
Id.
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repeatedly applied this analysis to protect transgender people in
subsequent cases.26 On October 8, 2019, the Supreme Court heard
oral arguments for three cases that hold the potential to drastically
change how Title VII is applied to cases involving sexual orientation
and gender identity.27
In addition to the differences in interpreting how Title VII applies
to members of the LGBTQIA+ community, a rift has divided the
executive branch between the EEOC in support of protection and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in opposition.28 The DOJ under the
Trump Administration argues the plain language meaning of “sex”
does not include gender identity and policies relegating people to
restroom use based on “biological” sex are applied to all employees
equally and thus are non-discriminatory.29 The DOJ has concluded
that on balance these policies protect the majority of employees from
the discomfort some claim to feel sharing common spaces with
transgender people.30
26. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (upholding a transgender woman’s claim of sex discrimination because,
by embracing feminine mannerisms and appearance, she did not conform to masculine stereotypes);
Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2010). Such cases focus on the discriminatory
perspective that in the employer’s view, the transgender person’s existence violates stereotypes about
how proper men and women should behave. Id.
27. Amy Howe, Court Releases October Calendar, SCOTUSBLOG (July 1, 2019, 2:58 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/court-releases-october-calendar-2/
[https://perma.cc/8P98KBKR]. The Court will rule on whether employment discrimination because of sex applies to sexualorientation discrimination in the consolidated cases of Bostock v. Clayton County and Altitude Express
v. Zarda. Id. The Court will determine whether employment discrimination laws prohibit discrimination
against transgender people per se based on their transgender status or by sex stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse precedent in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Id.
28. Allison Bader, Whose Bathroom Is It, Anyway?: The Legal Status of Transgender Bathroom
Access Under Federal Employment Law, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 741–42 (2018).
29. Id. at 742–44. The DOJ under the Trump Administration reversed position on several
transgender policies put in place by the DOJ under the Obama Administration, such as interpreting Title
VII to prohibit discrimination against transgender people in the workplace, interpreting Title IX to
require equal access to restrooms for all students based on gender identity, and allowing transgender
soldiers to openly serve in the military. Joseph Tanfani, Reversing Obama Policy, Sessions Says Job
Protections Don’t Cover Transgender People, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017, 1:30 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-transgender-20171005-story.html
[https://perma.cc/E4YV-9QCQ].
30. Bader, supra note 28, at 743. Proponents of this position often cite safety concerns related to
abuse by sexual predators, but statistics show that non-discrimination ordinances do not result in an
increase in sexual assault. Brynn Tannehill, Debunking Bathroom Myths, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 28,
2015,
8:29
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynn-tannehill/debunking-bathroommyths_b_8670438.html [https://perma.cc/L4DV-323V]. In thirty-five years of non-discrimination
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The EEOC, on the other hand, has taken the position that
differential treatment based on gender identity is sex discrimination
under Price Waterhouse’s broader interpretation and that a plainlanguage reading applies even beyond anatomy.31 The EEOC further
observed that transgender employees are burdened by being unable to
enjoy facilities consistent with their identities, as all cisgender
employees are able to, and that the transgender community is
exposed to higher levels of violence when using public bathrooms.32
By the same token, non-binary people are unable to enjoy facilities
consistent with their identities while restrooms remain binarily sexsegregated.33
B. Title IX
Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 is modeled
after Title VII and protects students against sex discrimination in
educational settings.34 Plaintiffs must establish that (1) they were
excluded from participating in an educational program due to sex, (2)
the educational program was receiving federal funding, and (3) the
discrimination caused them harm to maintain a claim under Title
IX.35 Consistent with its approach to Title VII, the DOJ under the
Trump Administration concluded that Title IX does not protect
transgender students in regards to restroom access, and much like its
approach to Title VII, this interpretation is out of line with the
majority of federal district and circuit court opinions.36
ordinances protecting bathroom access throughout the world, only one case has been found involving an
individual abusing the ordinance to commit sexual assault. Id.
31. Bader, supra note 28, at 745–47.
32. Id. Studies show almost seventy percent of transgender people had negative interactions in
bathrooms, fifty-four percent had experienced medical complications resulting from bathroom
avoidance, and that using bathrooms that do not match gender identity causes psychological harm. Id. at
747–48.
33. See id. at 745–47.
34. Heffernan, supra note 20, at 219.
35. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 747 (E.D. Va. 2018).
36. See Sandra Battle & T.E. Wheeler, II, Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 22, 2017)
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW94-3Q7L]. The Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the Department of
Education Office for Civil Rights issued a joint “Dear Colleague” letter on February 22, 2017,
rescinding previous guidance letters issued by the Department of Justice under the Obama
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In 2016, the Fourth Circuit addressed gender identity under Title
IX in the landmark case, Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,
in which a transgender boy was denied access to male restrooms at
his high school and brought a claim against the school board seeking
a preliminary injunction.37 The district court declined to recognize
Grimm as male and dismissed his claim, but the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded—primarily because of a nowrescinded guidance letter from the DOJ under the Obama
Administration.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but when the
guidance letter was revoked, the Court remanded the case back to the
district court for reconsideration in light of this turn of events.39 On
August 9, 2019, the district court ruled in favor of Grimm, awarding
him one dollar in damages, court costs, and an injunction requiring
the school to update his records to indicate he is male.40
C. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”41 In United
States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court established that to defend
Administration in 2015 and 2016, which provided transgender students should be allowed to use the
public facilities corresponding to their gender identity, on the grounds that legal analysis was lacking
and inconsistent with the express language of Title IX. Id.
37. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016). Despite
Grimm’s use of the male restrooms for seven weeks without incident, the school board denied his access
to the facilities when community members outside the school complained, leading Grimm to file suit in
pursuit of his rights under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 715–16.
38. Id. at 720 (holding the district court erred in finding no ambiguity in the text of Title IX in
relation to how transgender students should be classified in a binary gender system—by gender deemed
at birth or by gender identity—particularly in light of the guidance letter from the Department of
Education and DOJ, given that the Auer principle maintains that agency interpretations should be given
deference when under review by courts).
39. Bader, supra note 28, at 728–29. Other courts have noted that the rescission of the guidance does
not negate claims by transgender students under Title IX. A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 290 F.
Supp. 3d 321, 327 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“[I]t simply means that the 2016 Guidance cannot form the basis of
a Title IX claim.”).
40. Katelyn Polantz & Caroline Kelly, Judge Rules in Favor of Student in Virginia Transgender
Bathroom Case, CNN (Aug. 9, 2019, 7:34 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/09/politics/studentvirginia-wins-transgender-bathroom-case/index.html?no-st=1565415881
[https://perma.cc/S8QTH6ML].
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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gender-based discriminatory conduct a party must demonstrate an
“exceedingly persuasive” justification showing that an important
government objective is served and the discriminatory practice
employed is “substantially related” to achieving that goal.42 Prior
precedent laid out in Reed v. Reed in 1971 stated that, under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, laws could
not treat individuals differently based only on criteria unrelated to the
objective of the particular statute.43
When addressing gender-based discrimination claims under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court uses the intermediate
scrutiny test to determine constitutionality, as opposed to the strict
scrutiny standard applied to race-based discrimination claims.44
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed gender identity
rights under the Equal Protection Clause, the trend among federal
courts is to hold that the Equal Protection Clause does bar
discrimination.45
II. Analysis
The applicability of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 to sex
discrimination claims in relation to public bathroom access hinges on
42. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539–40, 553–56, 571–72 (1996) (challenging the
Virginia Military Institute’s policy of admitting only men as violating the Equal Protection Clause by
denying female applicants to the program). Although the Court in United States v. Virginia rejected
Virginia’s proposed plan of a separate program for women on the basis the proposed plan was not equal
in nature and benefit to the original program, it did not reject the concept of a separate program outright
as a correction to the violation. Id. at 550–53. It is unclear if this ambiguity constitutes an exclusion of
the reasoning that “separate but equal” has no place in education from Brown v. Board of Education
being applied to gender-based claims or not. See Marisa Pogofsky, Transgender Persons Have a
Fundamental Right to Use Public Bathrooms Matching Their Gender Identity, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 733,
755–56 (2018).
43. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 560–61.
44. Diana Elkind, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity: An
Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 900–01 (2007). The Court has supported this distinction of scrutiny standards on
the basis that race is immutable, the political powerlessness of racial minority groups, and the primary
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment in light of the Civil Rights era. Pogofsky, supra note 42, at 754–
55.
45. Pogofsky, supra note 42, at 750. The Equal Protection Clause extends to gender expression and
medical care. Know Your Rights LGBTQ Rights, ACLU https://www.aclu.org/know-yourrights/transgender-people-and-law [https://perma.cc/QC6M-8VDM] (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
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whether denying access to a sex-segregated restroom is a
discriminatory practice under each statute.46 As courts have found,
defining sex is not as cut-and-dry as it may once have seemed.47
Unlike Title VII and Title IX, the constitutionality of gender
discrimination is not determined by statutory interpretation.48 Instead,
the constitutionality of gender discrimination rests on the scrupulous
scrutiny of policies that potentially discriminate, which must be
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest when it comes
to suspect classifications or substantially related to an important
government interest for quasi-suspect classifications.49
A.

Evaluating Statutory Claims Under Title VII and Title IX
Reliance on the argument that Congress understood sex to be
physiologically mandated at the time such statutes were enacted fails
to account for the long history of awareness that gender does not
always neatly fall into binary categories—the history of which
legislators would have been aware when considering the bills.50 The
D.C. district court criticized this congressional intent approach as “an
elevation of judge-supposed legislative intent over clear statutory
46. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 2007); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir.
2004).
47. See, e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 522 (3d Cir. 2018) (describing sex as
the “anatomical and physiological processes that lead to or denote male or female,” which typically lead
to a determination at birth based on external genitalia and gender as a “broader societal construct”
encompassing how sex is defined in a cultural context); Adams v. Sch. Bd., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1298
(M.D. Fla. 2018) (listing external genitalia, internal sex organs, chromosomes, gonads, fetal and
pubertal hormones, neurology, hypothalamic sex, and gender identity and role as components of
gender).
48. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971).
49. Id. (“[A] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”).
50. Brief for interACT: Advocates for Intersex Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 19–23, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (No. 16-273), 2017
WL 930053. Classical Jewish writings in the Mishnah, the Talmud, and legal codes make hundreds of
mentions of six different sex categories. Id. at 19–20. Greco-Roman culture as well as medieval and
Renaissance Europe recognized hermaphroditic third sexes in law and custom. Id. at 20–21. The
Victorian medical community divided individuals into five sex classifications. Id. at 22. “[B]y the
1960s, the causes of specific intersex conditions . . . were already understood and documented [in the
United States.]” Id. at 23.
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text.”51 Moreover, courts that have attempted to apply this standard
have necessarily wrestled with how to categorize gender when
multiple physiological factors point to different conclusions and
binary gender lines are blurred; this has led to drastically differing
results.52
As a practical matter, a ruling that would require public
accommodations to make a determination of which binary sex an
individual is a member of based on physiological elements would be
nearly impossible to implement. It would require invasive inspections
of physical gender markers, and scientific consensus now establishes
that such markers are not the primary determinant of one’s true sex—
which instead is gender identity.53 Binary-based judgments of gender
expression have already made clear that this sort of system will never
work, as it results in biased and discriminatory judgments that
determine access rights based on conformity to the established
expectations of the gender binary.54 Gender expression is the external
appearance of gender as expressed by one’s behavior, clothing, and
grooming choices; and it may or may not conform to society’s
traditional social norms.55

51. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (“This is no longer a tenable approach to statutory
construction . . . Supreme Court decisions subsequent . . . have applied Title VII in ways Congress could
not have contemplated.”).
52. See, e.g., Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1114 (D. Colo. 2016) (holding a binary-only
gender policy violated intersex individual’s rights when passport was denied); Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (finding a transgender woman who had undergone genderaffirming surgery and changed her birth certificate to reflect her male gender invalidated her marriage);
Richards v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272–73 (N.Y. Special Term 1977) (holding
a transgender woman who had undergone gender-affirming surgery and was female by “all other known
indicators of sex” besides chromosomally should not be barred from participating in women’s tennis
tournaments).
53. See Brief for interACT: Advocates for Intersex Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 50, at 37–40.
54. See, e.g., Nina Golgowski, Woman Says She was Accosted in Walmart Bathroom After Being
Mistaken
As
Trans,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(May
18,
2016,
1:40
PM)
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/woman-allegedly-mistaken-astransgender_us_573b3f95e4b0ef86171c1762 [https://perma.cc/6QNH-ELV2] (reporting a Connecticut
woman was verbally abused in a Walmart bathroom when another patron assumed she was transgender).
55. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-and-definitions
[https://perma.cc/EX4E-JKZ5] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
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In enacting statutory protections for gender, Congress provided a
wide ban on sex discrimination in all its forms rather than a specified
list of prohibited acts that constituted discrimination.56 Congress was
more concerned with casting a broad net to catch and eradicate sex
discrimination when it enacted Title IX to supplement Title VII
protections in the educational sphere.57 Even if Congress did not
intend for these statutes to cover individuals outside of the gender
binary, the Supreme Court has held that lack of specific intent is not
necessarily determinative of statutory reach.58 As Justice Scalia wrote
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., “[S]tatutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils ”59
The Code of Federal Regulations provides that schools “may
provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the
basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one sex shall
be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other
sex.”60 Unlike their classmates who identify with their assigned sex,
non-binary youth are unable to enjoy the use of public facilities that
affirm their gender identity.61 Students who are denied access to
bathrooms consistent with their gender identity are not being
provided with comparable facilities and are harmed by this
inequality; many suffer from health complications related to holding
56. Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center et al. Supporting Respondent at 13–18,
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL
1057278.
57. Id. at 13–18. Principal sponsor Senator Birch Bayh described Title IX as “far-reaching” and with
a reach specifically left open-ended in order to “root out, as thoroughly as possible . . . the social evil of
sex discrimination in education.” 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment . . . resulting from sex stereotypes.”).
58. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000); see
also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978) (“It is not for [the Court] to speculate . . . on
whether Congress would have altered its stance had . . . specific events . . . been anticipated.”).
59. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that although the
“principal evil” Congress was targeting when it enacted Title VII was not male-on-male sexual
harassment, there is no justification for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment from coverage
under the statute).
60. 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2018).
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant and Urging Reversal
at 9–10, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (No. 15-2056), 2015
WL 6585237.
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their urine for extended periods, such as bladder and kidney
infections, which affect their ability to participate in school
programs.62 They are not only denied full participation in school
programs when they lose the “basic condition” of bathroom access,
but are also deprived of “equal status, respect, and dignity.”63
Moreover, the relegation of transgender and non-binary persons to
separate unisex restrooms—as in Grimm’s case—inherently forces
those individuals into the category of “other,” ostracizing them from
their peers and reinforcing the assertion that they do not fit in by
denying them identity recognition.64 Marisa Pogovsky explains that
there are common lessons to learn from an era when AfricanAmericans were systematically excluded from common spaces by
Jim Crow statutes that were often supported by reasoning similar to
the bathroom narrative—the need to protect women from sexual
assault or moral corruption from those who would abuse the grant of
equal rights.65 The Supreme Court has continuously repudiated rules
that impermissibly discriminate by imposing physical separation of a
group of people from places where they would otherwise be present
to protect some individuals from perceived danger or discomfort.66

62. Amici Curiae Brief of Scholars Who Study the Transgender Population Supporting Respondent
at 14–15, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (No. 16-273), 2017
WL 1057277 (reporting greater absenteeism, poorer performance in school, withdrawal from public
spaces, physical health impacts such as bladder infections and kidney problems, and mental health
impacts including increased risk of suicide). “Since gender conforming individuals . . . can simply use
the facilities designated for those of their biological gender with whom they identify, the transgender
individual will only achieve true equality once [they are] permitted the same liberty and personal
dignity.” Elkind, supra note 44, at 921–22.
63. Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756, at *10 (Apr. 1, 2015)
(denying access to a bathroom corresponding with gender identity constitutes sex discrimination within
the meaning of Title VII and deprives the employee of dignity and respect).
64. Elkind, supra note 44, at 927 (“Unisex itself is an instrument of discrimination . . . if society is
composed only of those who enter the women’s room and those who enter the men’s room, requiring
someone to use a third bathroom tells them they are outside society.”).
65. See also Pogofsky, supra note 42, at 753–54 (comparing sex segregation and gender
discrimination against transgender persons with Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation in the Civil
Rights Era).
66. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. Supporting Appellant
at 22–30, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (No. 16-273), 2017
WL 956145 (describing the historical rejection of rules that segregate groups of people from recreational
facilities, workplaces, and housing).
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The position of the EEOC provides reprieve in employment under
Title VII, but if the conciliation process fails to resolve the
discrimination claim, the victims of gender discrimination in the
workplace must rely on the federal courts within their jurisdiction.67
Fortunately, many federal circuits now recognize that discrimination
against transgender people is sex discrimination as a matter of law.68
The EEOC supporters argue that Price Waterhouse and Oncale
create an expansive framework for the protection of gender identity
in the workplace.69 Even the recent Supreme Court decision
legalizing same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, seemed to imply
that equal rights in gender identity and expression should be
recognized under federal law when the majority opened with, “The
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity.”70
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., a transgender woman brought suit after
she was fired from her position at a funeral home after she announced
her intention to begin transitioning from male to female presentation
at work.71 The district court ruled that transgender status itself was
not a protected class, but upheld the suit against a motion to dismiss
on the basis of her failure to adhere to gender stereotypes.72
67. See Lusardi, 2015 WL 1607756, at *8–10; What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed, U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm
[https://perma.cc/S63K-232T] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). If the EEOC determines there is reasonable
cause to believe discrimination occurred, the parties are first invited to resolve the matter in an informal
process called conciliation. Id. Failing that, the EEOC may choose to pursue enforcement against the
statutory violation by filing suit directly or may give the plaintiff a notice of right to sue, which allows
them to file suit personally with their own finances and legal counsel. Id.
68. Legal Developments on Gender Identity Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY
1,
1
n.2
(May
2018),
https://mobile.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDownloadDocument?pubId=&eodoc=true&documentID=3508
[https://perma.cc/CC7S-5T9C] (listing cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
holding discrimination against transgender people to be sex discrimination under federal law in addition
to a host of district court cases across the country).
69. Bader, supra note 28, at 745.
70. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
71. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560,
568–69 (6th Cir. 2018). The employee had worked at the funeral home from 2007 to 2013 without issue
while presenting as a male. Id. at 567.
72. Id. at 569–70.
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However, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment to
the funeral home based on religious protections.73 The Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the transgender
employee could state a claim not only under a theory of sex
stereotypes, but also on the basis of transgender status per se, and that
continuing to employ her did not substantially burden her employer’s
ability to practice his religion.74 The Supreme Court will rule on the
case to determine if transgender status—or more broadly, gender
identity—is protected under federal sex discrimination laws.75
B. Evaluating Constitutional Claims Under the Equal Protection
Clause
Suspect classifications target groups that (1) share a distinguishing
characteristic as a group that is considered immutable, (2) have
historically faced discrimination because of that characteristic, (3) are
politically powerless, and (4) are treated disparately based on
something other than actual ability.76 Transgender and non-binary
people share a distinguishing characteristic of incongruence between
their gender identity and the sex they were assigned at birth.77 In
2013, psychologists confirmed a shift in their perspective on the
treatment of those who do not identify with the sex they were deemed
at birth, recognizing that gender identity is an immutable trait rather
than a pathological disorder.78
73. Id. at 570. The district court determined that enforcing Title VII against the employer would
substantially burden his religious exercise, protected under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
that the EEOC had not proven that enforcement was the least restrictive way of achieving the interest of
eliminating sex discrimination in the workplace. Id.
74. Id. at 574–75, 586–90, 600.
75. Howe, supra note 27.
76. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (finding that classifications based on
sex—in this case within the binary system—are suspect and subject to higher scrutiny).
77. See Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]ransgender
status is a sufficiently discernible characteristic to define a discrete minority class . . . transgender
people often face backlash in everyday life when their status is discovered.”).
78. Gender
Dysphoria,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N
1,
1–2
(2013),
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-GenderDysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MRF-RZUC] (showing psychologists no longer view gender identity
that differs from assigned sex as a pathological disorder and recognize distress is not inherent to crossgender identification). The Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
changed “gender identity disorder” to “gender dysphoria” to avoid the pathologizing
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The National Transgender Discrimination Survey and the United
States Transgender Survey show that people whose gender identity
does not match the sexes they were deemed at birth historically face
high levels of discrimination in public accommodations, from
healthcare to employment to education.79 Courts have found that
minorities who represent a small percentage of the population tend to
be politically powerless for the purposes of consideration as a suspect
class.80 Finally, gender identity bears no relation to productivity as an
individual; yet those that identify outside of the sex they were
assigned at birth continue to receive negative treatment.81
In discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause,
government classification on the basis of sex is subject to
intermediate scrutiny; therefore, the government must show the
existence of an important government interest, the discriminatory
practice substantially relates to the objective, and the objective
actually motivated the classification to pass muster.82 Courts require
classifications be “rationally related” to the state interest and prohibit
“arbitrary or irrational” classifications, which reflect “a
implication that there is something inherently disordered about incongruence between gender identity
and birth-assigned gender. Id.
79. Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender
Discrimination Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY & NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE (2011), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/NTDS_Exec_Summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JNT-CDKF]; Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender
Survey:
Executive Summary, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2015),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Executive-Summary-Dec17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86JR-8KFS]. The majority of school-age respondents experienced verbal or physical
abuse related to gender identity, thirty percent reported workplace mistreatment, nearly one-third were
living in poverty, and their unemployment rate was three times higher than that of the U.S. population.
James et al., supra. Many respondents reported mistreatment by health care professionals, not seeking
healthcare out of fear of mistreatment, or being unable to afford healthcare when they needed it. Id. at 8.
Additionally, nearly one-third of respondents reported experiencing homelessness, and nearly onequarter experienced some form of housing discrimination. Id. One in ten reported being denied access to
public restrooms in the past year, and more than half avoided using public restrooms out of fear. Id.
80. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (“[A]s a tiny
minority of the population, whose members are stigmatized for their gender non-conformity in a variety
of settings, transgender people are a politically powerless minority group.”); see also Obergefell v.
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“[L]ack of political power is caused by a number
of factors, including small population size and dispersion.”).
81. Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (“Some transgender people experience debilitating dysphoria
while living as the gender they were assigned at birth, but this is the product of a long history of
persecution forcing transgender people to live as those who they are not.”).
82. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539–40, 554–56 (1996).
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bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”83 Intermediate
scrutiny places the burden on the government to prove that not only a
particularly persuasive government interest exist that is served by the
rule at issue, but that the means of achieving that goal have been
tailored in a way that reduces potentially discriminatory effects as
much as possible, and the means were actually motivated by that
interest.84 The existence of viable alternatives that would eliminate or
greatly reduce the prejudicial effects of a particular statute bolsters
the determination that it violates the Constitution.85 While the
government must find a sufficient argument to justify its
discriminatory interpretation of sex, much is still left to judicial
discretion.86
The often-cited concern over safety in restrooms provides an
unfounded argument for state interest in maintaining sex segregation
in public restrooms, since it assumes that either transgender and nonbinary people present a danger to their cisgender counterparts or
cisgender people will pretend to be transgender to gain access to and
commit crimes in common spaces.87 In actuality, it is possible that
the danger in relegating people to bathrooms that do not match their
gender identity will result in violence against them.88 Furthermore,
such safety concerns are discriminatory because they are based on the
antiquated notion that women are frail and should be afforded more
protection.89
83. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985).
84. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 2:4 (Thompson Reuters 2018) (“The
requirements that the government demonstrate ‘important’ or ‘substantial’ justifications for its actions
and that the government establish a ‘substantial nexus’ or a ‘narrow tailoring’ of ends to means are the
touchstones of intermediate review.”). Intermediate scrutiny is a middle ground between the rational
basis and strict scrutiny standards. Id. Courts tend to show deference and do not often strike down
legislation under plain rational basis. Id. § 2:3. Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, is “so demanding that
it once was understood as virtually impossible for the government to satisfy.” Id. § 2:5.
85. Id. § 2:4.
86. Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing - Sex-Based Classifications Same-Sex Marriage Is Just
the Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009).
87. See Tannehill, supra note 30.
88. See James et al., supra note 79, at 14. Twelve percent of respondents reported being verbally
harassed, one percent physically attacked, and one percent sexually assaulted when accessing a restroom
in the past year. Id.
89. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (noting that “[t]raditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism,’” and holding such “gross,
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Another common concern of opponents is privacy, but multi-stall
restroom facilities inherently afford the same privacy protections for
anyone who decides to take advantage of them.90 Moreover, courts
have previously held that privacy concerns are not sufficient to
overcome the interest in individual rights to prevent gender
discrimination—as in the case of female journalists given access to
male locker rooms in professional athletics, a situation far less
integral to personal identity than gender identity and expression.91
Regardless, psychologists have seen no reported psychological harm
from those who share a public restroom with transgender people in
schools where inclusive policies are in place, whereas exclusive
policies likely contribute to a forty percent suicide attempt rate in the
transgender population, which is nine times that of the general U.S.
population.92 As the Third Circuit found in Doe v. Boyertown Area
School District, there is no recognized privacy right to not have to
share common spaces with a group of people, even where subjective
harm is claimed, because there is no objectively reasonable feeling of
such harm—particularly where restrooms do afford a variety of
different privacy protections for people.93

stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” cannot be supported by public policy); see also United
Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 197–200 (1991) (holding employer policy of
excluding all fertile female employees from particular jobs to protect the safety of potential pregnancies
constituted discrimination because safety concerns did not justify disparate treatment).
90. Elkind, supra note 44, at 925.
91. See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[P]rotecting ballplayer privacy may
be fully served by much less sweeping means [that do not] . . . interfere with [the] fundamental right to
pursue [one’s] profession . . . conforming to traditional notions of decency and propriety [is] clearly too
insubstantial [an interest] to merit serious consideration [w]eighed against [the] right to be free of
discrimination.”).
92. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics, American Psychiatric Association,
American College of Physicians, and 17 Additional Medical and Mental Health Organizations
Supporting Respondent at 13–14, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239
(2016) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 1057281.
93. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 531 (3d Cir. 2018) (declining to recognize a
constitutional right of privacy that extends to excluding the presence of students who do not share the
same birth sex from bathrooms and locker rooms, especially where all students, whether transgender or
not, who were uncomfortable with the privacy afforded by the multi-stall restrooms had the option of
single-user facilities).

Published by Reading Room, 2020

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4

400

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

III. Proposal
The solution for equal treatment of non-binary persons in public
accommodations is to demolish the binary concept of gender in the
law. Adherence to this two-option perception is unnecessary and fails
to recognize established scientific facts.94 The desegregation of
public accommodations is a necessary step towards equal gender
identity recognition under the law and the elimination of binarybased discrimination against non-binary and binary individuals
alike.95 Challenges to biology-based bathroom policies
for
transgender people within the binary have been successful in federal
district and circuit courts, but the current political climate makes it
unlikely that the argument for total desegregation of public
bathrooms is forthcoming despite its legal merits.96
A. Agency Interpretation or Judicial Discretion?
The rollback of the Obama Administration’s pro-equality guidance
in schools, prisons, homeless shelters, and the military is a strong
indicator that, at least under the Trump Administration, agency
interpretation will disfavor a diverse reading of sex in agency
regulatory actions.97 Moreover, a memo leaked from the Department
of Health and Human Services in October 2018 urged the “Big Four”
agencies that enforce different portions of Title IX to adopt a uniform
definition of sex as “male or female based on immutable biological
traits identifiable by or before birth . . . listed on a person’s birth
certificate, as originally issued.”98 These Big Four agencies include
94. See Denise Grady, Anatomy Does Not Determine Gender, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/health/transgender-trump-biology.html
[https://perma.cc/WQX3-Q9HD].
95. See Terry S. Kogan, Public Restrooms and the Distorting of Transgender Identity, 95 N.C. L.
REV. 1205, 1234 (2017); Portuondo, supra note 12, at 517, 519.
96. See infra Section III.A.
97. Erica L. Green, Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence
Under Trump
Administration,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html
[https://perma.cc/5NUK-7MWL].
98. Id. The definition was expected to be formally presented to the DOJ before the end of 2018 and
was considered “integral” to two proposed rules under review at the White House at the time, both of
which were expected to be released in the fall of 2018 for public comment before final issuance. Id. The

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/4

20

Graves: Breaking the Binary: Desegregation of Bathrooms

2020]

BREAKING THE BINARY

401

the Departments of Education, Justice, Health and Human Services,
and Labor.99
Should the Supreme Court issue a ruling holding that bathroom
segregation constitutes discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, the definition of sex under Title IX and Title VII would
consequently be interpreted to avoid conflict with that ruling.100
Discrimination against non-binary individuals should constitute a
suspect classification for the purposes of Fourteenth Amendment
claims because: (1) they share a distinguishing characteristic of
gender identity that diverges from sex assigned at birth, which
research has shown to be an immutable trait with roots in genetics;
(2) they face high levels of violence, unemployment, and
homelessness due to discrimination; (3) they have little ability to
protect themselves through use of the political process because they
make up a small percentage of the population; and (4) their disparate
treatment has no relationship to their actual ability.101 Even without
suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny, the government
interests that proponents cite in defense of biology-based bathroom
policies fail to meet the standard required by Fourteenth Amendment
gender jurisprudence under intermediate scrutiny, particularly when
balanced against the constitutional interest of equal protection for
minority groups that would otherwise be powerless.102
Despite its plain language, the intermediate scrutiny test’s wide
latitude for judicial discretion makes any ruling highly contingent on

memo quickly resulted in protest rallies in cities such as New York and Washington, including outside
the White House, with the viral “#WontBeErased” taking off on social media as gender-expansive
persons resisted being legally defined out of existence. Sarah Mervosh & Christine Hauser, At Rallies
and Online, Transgender People Say They #WontBeErased, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/us/transgender-reaction-rally.html
[https://perma.cc/97FRRTBH].
99. Id.
100. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (describing the canon of constitutional avoidance).
“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Id.
101. Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Obergefell v.
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Grady, supra note 94; see Bd. of Educ. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016); see also supra Section II.B.
102. See infra Section III.B.
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the makeup of the Court.103 Research shows that judges tend to vote
in line with their personal ideology, and that effect is more
pronounced when the case is a close vote.104 The case for the
elimination of sex-segregated public bathrooms would likely be such
a vote.105 With the recent confirmations of firmly conservative
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, and the retirement of Justice
Kennedy—famously the median judge providing the swing vote in
close cases—the Supreme Court is now made up of predominantly
conservative judges who will likely vote conservatively.106 That
being said, according to the Martin-Quinn ideology score, which uses
voting patterns to determine ideology, Chief Justice Roberts—now
the median justice—has been slowly shifting closer to the center over
the course of his tenure.107 Like same-sex marriage, gender identity
rights may be forced to wait until public opinion shifts more firmly in
favor of a gender-expansive view.108

103. See Jake J. Smith, Supreme Court Justices Become Less Impartial and More Ideological When
Casting
the
Swing
Vote,
KELLOGGINSIGHT
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/supreme-court-justices-become-less-impartial-and-moreideological-when-casting-the-swing-vote [https://perma.cc/QCK4-MZ3N] (describing judges’ tendency
to vote according to their personal ideologies based on the research of Tom Clark, B. Pablo Montagnes,
& Jörg L. Spenkuch). “A judge whom editorial writers depict as a mild conservative, or a hardline
liberal, will often vote like one.” Id.
104. Id.
[W]hen casting a pivotal vote, liberal justices are more likely to vote liberally while
conservatives are more likely to vote conservatively, compared to when those same
judges cast a non-pivotal vote.
....
. . . [T]he pattern becomes more pronounced for justices who are more ideologically
extreme . . . the more liberal or conservative a justice is, the more frequently he or she
votes in that direction when casting the deciding vote.
Id.
105. Jeannie Suk Gersen, A Moment of Uncertainty for Transgender Rights, NEW YORKER (Feb. 27,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-moment-of-uncertainty-for-transgender-rights
[https://perma.cc/MZM8-2589].
106. Alvin Chang, Brett Kavanaugh and the Supreme Court’s Drastic Shift to the Right,
Cartoonsplained, VOX (Sept. 14, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/7/9/17537808/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-right-cartoon
[https://perma.cc/W26C54H4].
107. Id.
108. Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politicsactivism/397052/ [https://perma.cc/8J3N-86P3]. “Much as Americans like to imagine judges,
particularly Supreme Court justices, as ahistorical applicators of a timeless code, the court is inevitably
influenced by the world around it. As social mores have evolved, the justices’ consensus has too.” Id.
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B. Balancing the Benefits of a Non-Binary System Against State
Concerns
As discussed in Section II of this note, the most common concerns
raised in opposition of equal bathroom rights are privacy and
safety.109 To survive intermediate scrutiny, these arguments must
show that both (1) the discriminatory policy is substantially related to
an important government interest and (2) there is a lack of viable
alternative ways that protect that interest without discriminating
against a group.110 Both privacy and safety fail to meet that
standard.111
Courts that recognize an interest in privacy in bathroom cases have
historically been focused on a supposed heightened right to privacy
from the opposite sex in the binary-gender system, with many courts
specifically noting concern over exposure of unclothed body parts.112
Public restrooms do not afford the same heightened level of privacy
from members of the same binary sex as they do members of the
opposite sex, nor have they been expected or required to; members of
the public routinely use the facilities without regard to any perceived
loss of privacy they endure from others in the restroom.113 Contrary
to the courts’ concerns, few users of public facilities disrobe outside
of the relative privacy of bathroom stalls.114 Moreover, stall cubicles
can be modified to provide additional privacy using floor-to-ceiling
partitions and shiplap-cut edges to remove sightlines in the gaps,
providing a viable non-discriminatory alternative.115
Fourth Circuit Judge Niemeyer described in a dissenting opinion
the concern of privacy as linked to “sexual responses prompted by
students’ exposure to the private body parts of students of the other
109. See supra Section II.B.
110. Smolla, supra note 84, § 2:3–5.
111. See supra Section III.B.
112. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734–35 (4th Cir. 2016)
(describing several cases that address privacy concerns from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits).
113. Portuondo, supra note 12, at 502.
114. Id. at 508.
115. Bathroom Privacy Ideas: Planning the Privacy in Your Bathroom, SCRANTON PRODUCTS (Oct.
2, 2017), https://www.scrantonproducts.com/bathroom-privacy-ideas/ [https://perma.cc/2SKN-XJ88].
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biological sex.”116 Following this logic to its natural end, it
presupposes that no users of public restrooms are sexually attracted
to members of the same binary sex.117 The sexual response argument
thus relies on heteronormative gender stereotypes that men are
attracted to women and women are attracted to men.118 It also
discounts the privacy rights with regard to sexual responses of those
that do not identify as heterosexual; implying that the LGBTQIA+
community’s right to privacy in public restrooms is not as
fundamental as Judge Niemeyer suggested the heterosexual
community’s privacy right is.119
In Virginia, the Supreme Court dicta allowed separate facilities by
resting on the “physical differences between men and women”—
allowing biological differences to justify different facilities.120
Functionally, the various anatomical structures at use in the public
restroom do not require different equipment like we see in the private
home bathroom and the single-user gender-neutral public toilet.121
However, not all people fall into the binary categories of physical
differences; for example, intersex and medically-transitioning
transgender individuals may have physical traits associated with both
or neither category.122 Upholding enforcement of sex segregation
under this framework would necessitate disclosure or physical
inspection of each bathroom user prior to entry, a practice much more
invasive to privacy.123 Moreover, such a practice would continue to
leave those with differing anatomical characteristics uncertain of the
appropriate bathroom for their use and require surgical medical

116. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 735.
117. See Portuondo, supra note 12, at 503.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
121. See Ian Spula, An Unexpected Ally of Gender-Neutral Restrooms: Building Codes, ARCHITECT
(Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.architectmagazine.com/practice/an-unexpected-ally-in-gender-neutralrestrooms-building-codes_o [https://perma.cc/Q3Q2-RDKZ] (describing how the 2018 International
Plumbing Code calls for all single-user restrooms to be designated for all-gender use).
122. See Intersex, supra note 16.
123. See Brief for interACT: Advocates for Intersex Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 50, at 37–40.
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transition for binary-identifying transgender individuals seeking to
use the facilities consistent with their gender identity.124
Safety concerns used to promote sex segregation of public
restrooms suffer from the same logical fallacy that privacy concerns
do. Those that raise concerns about violence in bathroom cases are
specifically worried about the threat of sexual assault.125 In relying
on the reasoning that separation from members of the opposite binary
sex promotes safety from sexual assault, proponents inherently
discount the potential for same-sex violence and depend on incorrect
gender stereotypes.126
Moreover, separated bathrooms have not prevented sexual assaults
in public bathrooms—sexual predators are not deterred by a sign on
the door.127 For transgender and non-binary individuals, being
relegated to a biology-based restroom often increases the threat to
safety, which is high even when using the bathrooms that correspond
with their gender identities.128 Segregated bathrooms may even
increase the risk of assault across the board because they isolate
victims and lessen the effect of safety in numbers, like parents have
found when separated from their children who are too old to
accompany them into the binary bathroom.129
CONCLUSION
The limitations of a binary system will never meet the needs of the
diverse gender spectrum.130 Ending sex segregation of public
restrooms in favor of multi-user, all-gender restrooms will eliminate

124. See Intersex, supra note 16; Jack Drescher & Jack Pula, Expert Q&A: Gender Dysphoria, AM.
PYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/expert-q-and-a
[https://perma.cc/BZN7-M2J7] (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (noting many transgender individuals choose
not to undergo surgical transition for a variety of reasons).
125. Portuondo, supra note 12, at 512 n.268.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 512.
128. See Grant et al., supra note 79, at 14.
129. See Emily Peck, We Don’t Need Separate Bathrooms for Men and Women, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar.
31,
2016,
5:26
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gender-neutralbathrooms_us_56fd6ccbe4b083f5c607262c [https://perma.cc/T3HY-P4ND].
130. See Hanssen, supra note 5, at 287.
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the problems associated with enforcing any sort of biology-based
policy while promoting equal protection for non-binary persons and
ultimately breaking down gender stereotypes and social stigmas.131
With the Supreme Court leaning more and more conservatively and
the Trump Administration rolling back previous protections for those
falling outside of the traditional gender binary system, desegregation
of public bathrooms is unlikely to be seen in the foreseeable future.132
While there may be jurisdiction-dependent changes at the state and
lower circuit federal levels, nation-wide change will have to come
from the people, much like the slow march of progress for same-sex
marriage and sexuality recognition.133
As public opinion shifts in favor of equal protection, courts will
more likely find in favor of plaintiffs seeking redress of the failings
of the binary system.134 Ideally, this redress will come in the form of
a definitive Supreme Court decision laying to rest sex segregation of
public facilities because a system of separate facilities that ignores
the diverse range of gender and the inherent complexity of sex
characteristic combinations is inherently inadequate—it is failing the
non-binary community.

131.
132.
133.
134.

See supra Part III.
See Chang, supra note 106; Green, Benner & Pear, supra note 97.
See Fleming & McFadden-Wade, supra note 2, at 160–61; Ball, supra note 108.
Ball, supra note 108.
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